At a glance
| Item | Position |
|---|---|
| Act and provision | Income-tax Act, 2025, section 363 |
| Official heading | Orders of Appellate Tribunal. |
| Location | Chapter XVIII: Appeals, revisions and alternate dispute resolutions; Part A: Appeals; 2: Appeals to Appellate Tribunal |
| General commencement | 1 April 2026 |
| Research date | 15 October 2026 |
| Legal status | Enacted and operative |
| Legal function | ITAT orders, rectification, stay and communication |
The section operates within the Act’s charging and computation framework. The period and applicable version must be identified before applying it. S1, sections 1(3), 3, 4 and 363
Both parties must have an opportunity to be heard
The Tribunal may make such orders on the appeal as it thinks fit after giving both parties a hearing opportunity. This is the decision power in the appeal; section 362 separately establishes which orders can be brought before it. S1, Section 363(1)
Rectification concerns an apparent record mistake
The Tribunal may amend its subsection (1) order for a mistake apparent from the record within six months from the end of the month of the order, when brought to its notice by the assessee or AO. The provision should not be presented as a general rehearing of every disputed conclusion. Diary the statutory amendment period promptly rather than assume an application automatically extends it. S1, Section 363(2)
Adverse rectification needs a hearing; assessee applications have a fee
An amendment enhancing assessment, reducing refund or otherwise increasing the assessee’s liability requires a reasonable hearing opportunity. An assessee’s rectification application carries a ₹50 fee. This is distinct from the ₹500 stay-application fee under section 362(8). S1, Section 363(3), Section 363(4)
Four years is a qualified disposal objective
Where possible, the Tribunal may decide an appeal within four years from the end of the financial year of its filing under section 362(1) or (2). The section does not convert expiry of this qualified objective into automatic allowance of the appeal. S1, Section 363(5)
The statutory initial-stay framework
On the merits of an assessee’s application concerning a section 362(1) appeal, the text permits stay for up to 180 days from the stay order. It requires deposit of at least 20% of the tax, interest, fee, penalty or other payable sum, or security of an equal amount. The appeal is to be disposed of within the stated stay period. Filing an appeal or paying only the application fee is not a stay order. S1, Section 363(6)(a), Section 363(6)(b)
The text requires an application and non-attributable delay for extension
For an appeal not disposed of within the initial period, the text requires an extension application, compliance with subsection (6), and the Tribunal’s satisfaction that the delay is not attributable to the assessee. It states an aggregate limit of 365 days for original and extended stay and requires disposal within the allowed period. Read this wording with the constitutional qualification below rather than treating the text in isolation. S1, Section 363(7)(a), Section 363(7)(b)
Automatic-vacation wording has a material precedent issue
Subsection (8), as printed in the inspected Act, says the stay stands vacated if the appeal is not disposed of within the allowed period, even where the assessee did not cause the delay. Similar old-Act wording was addressed by the Supreme Court in Pepsi Foods. The statutory wording and that precedent are both material; this article does not pronounce a fresh constitutional ruling on section 363. S1, Section 363(8)
Pepsi Foods: relevant holding and limits
The Supreme Court held the old section 254(2A) treatment of assessee-caused and non-assessee-caused delay constitutionally impermissible, and read the third proviso so that vacation after the stated periods depended on delay attributable to the assessee. The judgment concerns the 1961 Act, not section 363 of the 2025 Act. Its reasoning is directly relevant to similar automatic-vacation wording, but does not by itself establish a new-Act stay order, automatic indefinite continuation or removal of every deposit/security condition. No directly deciding section 363 judgment was verified. S5, paragraphs 22 and 25
Costs are discretionary
The Tribunal has discretion over costs of the appeal. A party should not assume that succeeding necessarily produces a particular cost award. S1, Section 363(9)
Copies and departmental electronic communication
A copy of the order goes to the assessee. A copy also goes electronically to the jurisdictional Principal Commissioner or Commissioner on the designated portal designed by the Director General or Principal Director General; time-limit provisions for appeal, reference, revision or otherwise apply accordingly. Preserve the relevant communication evidence and use the particular remedy’s limitation rule. S1, Section 363(10)(a), Section 363(10)(b)
Finance Act, 2026 amendment
Finance Act, 2026 substitutes subsection (10) from 1 April 2026, adding the specified electronic departmental communication route and its connection with statutory time limits. It does not replace every remedy’s separate limitation period with one common deadline. S1; S4, section 82
Finality is subject to the High Court appeal provision
Tribunal appellate orders are final save as provided in section 365. That section requires a substantial question of law for the High Court appeal; an unhappy party cannot assume an unrestricted factual rehearing. S1, Section 363(11)
Choose the governing Act before choosing the appeal route
This article explains the 2025 Act. Section 536 preserves the earlier Act for the specified earlier-year proceedings; the date of an appellate order alone does not decide which Act governs. Keep the assessment period, initiating proceeding, order appealed against and its communication record together. The section numbers and new prescribed forms here should not be copied automatically into a saved 1961-Act proceeding. S1, section 536(2)(c)
Hypothetical illustrations
Deposit and application fee are different
Facts: For tax year 2026–27, the payable sums relevant to a stay request total ₹10 lakh. The assessee offers the statutory minimum deposit, with merits and all other requirements separately considered.
Assumptions: The stated facts are hypothetical and supported by records. Any rates illustrated are base income-tax rates; surcharge, cess, interest and penalties are excluded unless expressly calculated. Amounts are exact at the precision shown; no additional rounding adjustment is illustrated unless expressly stated.
Question: What does the printed 20% condition produce?
Analysis: 20% × ₹10 lakh = ₹2 lakh, or the stated equivalent security route. The ₹500 stay-application fee under section 362(8) is separate. Meeting the amount alone does not compel a stay order.
Conclusion: The statutory minimum amount is ₹2 lakh on these facts. S1
Rectification clock
Facts: For tax year 2026–27, the Tribunal passes its order on 12 August 2026.
Assumptions: The stated facts are hypothetical and supported by records. Any rates illustrated are base income-tax rates; surcharge, cess, interest and penalties are excluded unless expressly calculated. Amounts are exact at the precision shown; no additional rounding adjustment is illustrated unless expressly stated.
Question: What period does subsection (2) state?
Analysis: Six months from the end of August 2026 ends on 28 February 2027. This is the stated period for amendment; do not delay bringing an apparent mistake to notice or assume a general merits-review right.
Conclusion: Record the order-month end and act promptly. S1
Reader questions
Can the 365-day issue be answered solely by quoting subsection (8)?
A reliable explanation must also address Pepsi Foods and the limits of its application to the new provision. Obtain a case-specific judicial assessment; neither automatic perpetual stay nor an unqualified new-Act constitutional conclusion is certified here. S1, S5